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Abstract
The decentralisation of policy responsibilities from the national to the local level 
in the domain of social policies is meant to facilitate a better fit to local conditions, 
and, consequently, inspire local variation in social policy positions. This article 
examines two questions: (1) to what extent do Dutch local party branches’ social 
policy positions deviate from their national mother party and local peer parties and 
(2) do local conditions explain this deviation? To answer these questions, we devel-
oped a dataset including 168 local party manifestos from 27 strategically selected 
municipalities and 8 national party manifestos. Our analyses show limited devia-
tion in local parties’ positions compared to their national mother party and other 
local branches of their national mother party. This suggests that the social policies 
addressed in the party manifestos of local parties seem to reflect a process of institu-
tional isomorphism. Furthermore, the limited deviation that does exist in local par-
ties’ social policy positions is not convincingly larger in municipalities (1) that are 
smaller, (2) that have higher social benefit dependency, or (3) that have high vote 
shares for local independent challengers. This is contrary to what can be expected 
based on the contingency theory.
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Introduction
National governments often justify decentralisation by pointing to a tighter fit 
between policy measures and the problems those policies aim to address (Costa-
Font and Greer 2013, p. 6). In line with this approach, it can be argued that local 
parties are better equipped to tailor policies to local needs as they are better 
informed about local circumstances (Boogers and Voerman 2010; Clark 2004). 
Consequently, considering the variation in needs and circumstances across munic-
ipalities, deviation in social policy positions from national parties is expected. 
This resembles the so-called contingency theory (Donaldson 2001), claiming that 
a misfit with local conditions inspires the feedback needed to fine-tune policies 
to local conditions. With the widespread trend towards decentralisation of social 
policy responsibilities and the devolution of authorities from national to local 
governments (Borghi and van Berkel 2007; de Vries 2000; Falleti 2005), local 
branches, instead of national political parties, become responsible for developing 
social policies.
However, adjustments to local circumstances could generate tensions between 
their role as political players in the local arena on the one hand, and as repre-
sentatives of their national mother party’s ideology on the other (Geser 1999). 
Moreover, insights from institutional isomorphism theory (Dimaggio and Pow-
ell 1983) suggest that local deviations in social policy positions are not self-evi-
dent. Various institutional pressures exist in the type of complex organisational 
environments in which local political party branches must operate (Boogers and 
Voerman 2010). More specifically, pressures to align with the central party’s 
preferences may impede the adjustments to local circumstances that local party 
branches try to make. As such, institutional pressures could hamper achieving the 
desired fine-tuning of decentralised social policies to local conditions.
The 2015 decentralisation of the Participation Act in the Netherlands (for a 
more elaborate description see: Dijkhoff 2014), provides a good opportunity 
to examine whether decentralisation of social policy leads to the desired local 
political fine-tuning or not. The Participation Act obliges municipalities to pro-
vide social welfare services, such as matching, training, and subsidised employ-
ment”, as well as “income support for less than fully disabled persons who have 
no employment history (as opposed to former employees)” (Vermeulen 2017, p. 
128).
Our main research questions are twofold: (1) to what extent do Dutch local 
party branches’ social policy positions deviate from their national mother parties 
and local peer parties and (2) do local conditions explain this deviation?
As decentralisation is still in its early stage, we focus on local party manifestos 
drawn up for local elections to answer these questions, as these are the docu-
ments in which local variation will first manifest itself. The production of local 
party manifestos has been viewed as the indicator of party politicisation of local 
governments (Ashworth 2000; Jones 1975). “These manifestos outline policies 
that parties will enact once elected to legislative or executive office” (Lowe et al. 
2011, p. 124). Using party manifestos allows us to examine whether local party 
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branches operate as local ‘principals’ or national ‘puppets’ in determining their 
positions concerning the new social policy responsibilities. We also think that, 
despite the one-policy and one-country focus in this research, our findings could 
provide relevant insights for other types of decentralised policies and for the poli-
tics of decentralising social policies from national to local governments in other 
countries.
We developed a unique data set to answer our research questions. It includes rel-
evant information on local party manifestos for more than two dozen strategically 
selected Dutch municipalities that vary on important aspects, e.g. population size, 
social benefit dependency, political constellation, and region (e.g. Breeman et  al. 
2015). We followed a widely used technique (cf. Cole 2005; Gross and Jankowski 
2018) to systematically code and analyse the social policy positions reported in 
those manifestos. The dataset contains 168 manifestos of local party branches, in 
addition to national party manifestos from the eight largest political parties.
The constitutional design of the Netherlands is a decentralised unitary system in 
which each of 380 municipalities has its own democratic legitimacy (Andeweg and 
Irwin 2005; Breeman et al. 2015). All municipal councils are directly elected every 
4 years on a fixed day. Whilst the electoral support for independent local parties has 
increased, local party branches still make up the lion’s share of local electoral sup-
port in the Netherlands (Boogers and Voerman 2010).
This article is structured as follows: Sect. 2 explores the literature on institutional 
isomorphism and contingency theory in order to find theoretical scenarios for how 
social policy positions are likely to be determined by local parties. Section 3 out-
lines the data and methods used. Section 4 presents the results, and, in Sect. 5, we 
discuss the implications of our findings.
Local party’s social policy positions: contingency versus institutional 
pressures
Two specific theories inform scenarios for local party behaviour pertaining to the 
decentralisation of social policies. Institutional isomorphism theory emphasises con-
siderations which would ‘force’ local party branches to follow their national mother 
parties, while contingency theory points to conditions that would ‘force’ local par-
ties to adapt social policy positions to local conditions.
Institutional isomorphism
The desire to adapt to local conditions might not be as self-evident for local party 
branches as it seems (Boogers and Voerman 2010). Since political parties represent 
specific ideologies and normative viewpoints, local party representatives will gener-
ally hold like-minded ideas. Accordingly, a situation can arise in which social policy 
positioning of national parties and their local branches shows a strong resemblance, 
regardless of differences in local conditions.
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Institutional isomorphism theory suggests that three specific institutional pres-
sures are key drivers of public organisation behaviour and design in their quest for 
legitimacy: coercive, normative, and mimetic (George and Desmidt 2014). Coercive 
pressures reflect the imposition of organisational patterns by the authority on which 
organisations depend. Normative pressures are associated with adopting patterns or 
norms which are considered appropriate. Finally, mimetic pressures result in adopt-
ing patterns of, supposedly, successful organisations (Dimaggio and Powell 1983). 
Due to one or more of these pressures, a situation of so-called ‘institutional isomor-
phism’ emerges: i.e. a situation where all organisations look rather similar (Dimag-
gio and Powell 1983; George et al. 2018).
At least two sources of isomorphism may lead to congruent positions among 
local party branches. First, the ideological congruence of local party branches with 
their national mother party can inspire normative isomorphism. Shared values will, 
in this scenario, translate into similar social policy positions. Second, national party 
offices can inspire coercive isomorphism by facilitating the drafting of local party 
manifestos by organising meetings and supplying information, and sometimes even 
templates (cf. George and Desmidt 2014; Ashworth et  al. 2007). Which specific 
form of isomorphism is possibly in play cannot be inferred from the data availa-
ble, but generally isomorphism theory tells us to expect that local branches from 
the same national mother party demonstrate similar social policy positions in their 
manifestos.
Contingency theory
Contingency theory claims that contextual characteristics are key drivers of organi-
sational behaviour (Donaldson 2001). Contingency determinants refer to pressures 
that originate from outside the control of the organisation, such as economic devel-
opments (Donaldson 1987). Previous research using contingency theory reveals that 
organisations adapt their structures to create a ‘fit’ between the organisational char-
acteristics and context conditions (Donaldson 2001; George and Desmidt 2014). As 
argued by Donaldson (2001, p. 12), “structural change occurs in response to contin-
gency change and is triggered by the feedback effect from low performance caused 
by misfit”. This feedback effect resonates with the basic assumption of policy decen-
tralisation: local politicians and policy makers have a better view of the specific con-
ditions that a given policy aims to address. This implies that the positions of local 
branches of national parties may differ from the ideological position of their mother 
party to create a better fit with local conditions: “if local parties wish to participate 
in local government, they must adopt policies relevant to the community they aspire 
to represent” (Clark 2004, pp. 40–41). Various local conditions could be relevant in 
determining local policies (Geser 1999), but for the aim of this research—determin-
ing national–local position deviation rather than ideological positioning of parties 
through time (e.g. Adams et al. 2004, 2009)—we focus on three likely candidates: 
population size, dependency on social benefits, and the salience of local independent 
parties.
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Population size is possibly relevant in the delegation of sovereignty from vot-
ers to popular representatives (Bovens 2007). We suggest that the accountability 
mechanism associated with this sovereignty is more salient in municipalities with a 
smaller population size than in municipalities with a larger population size, as poli-
ticians in the former operate closer to citizens. Consequently, they are more likely 
to be held accountable than politicians in municipalities with a larger population 
size. Therefore, it can be expected that local party branches in smaller municipali-
ties are more likely to modify their manifesto in line with local circumstances (cf. 
Stoker 1991). As a result, we expect that deviation in social policy positions from 
the national mother party and local peer parties occurs more often in municipalities 
with a smaller population size.
Based on the party competition theory (Budge and Farlie 1983), the importance 
of a topic could also be influential for social policy position development. Therefore, 
the second context condition that is possibly relevant is the share of citizens depend-
ing on social benefits. High shares lead to more pressure on local parties to address 
this social problem and, thus, to tailor their social policy positions to local condi-
tions—Pogorelis and colleagues have already demonstrated something similar for 
local elections in Scotland and England (2005). In short, we expect that deviation in 
social policy positions from the national mother party and local peer parties occurs 
more often in municipalities with higher levels of social benefit dependency.
We expect that the third context condition relevant for local party behaviour is 
the salience of independent local parties. Independent parties can play a distinc-
tive role in local politics as they have no ties with national parties. They can clearly 
focus on local issues and are ‘said to be more responsive than local party branches 
to local issues’ (Boogers and Voerman 2010, p. 78). This representation of local 
issues would pose no threat for local party branches if local independent parties 
were marginal players, as was roughly the case until the 1990s. However, their large 
upswing since then has created anxiety among local party branches. In line with 
the threat mechanism theory, we expect that the salience of local independent chal-
lengers could increase the (perceived) risk that local party branches might lose seats 
in the next election (Boyne et al. 2001). Consequently, local party branches facing 
strong competition from local independent parties feel more inclined to modify their 
manifesto to local circumstances. Hence, we expect that deviation in social policy 
positions from the national mother party and local peer parties occurs more often in 
municipalities where independent local parties receive high vote shares.
Data and methods
A dataset with Dutch local party manifestos does yet not exist. Therefore, we trav-
elled great lengths to develop one that contains all necessary information needed 
to empirically scrutinise the expectations outlined above. Our dataset allowed us to 
examine if variation in local social policy positions existed, and if so, whether this 
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variation was patterned in line with the contingency theory. In order to do so, we 
measured social policy positions in two ways: topic presence and position-taking.
Case selection and coding
First, we followed Van de Bovenkamp and Vollaard (2017) in strategically select-
ing municipalities that contrasted in characteristics.1 Following the selection process 
of Andeweg and Irwin (2005), Breeman et al (2015), and Van de Waart and Brou-
wer (2015), we selected nine small, nine medium, and nine large municipalities that 
showed substantial variation in social benefit dependency, political constellation at 
the time of the manifesto development, and the region of the Netherlands in which 
they are located.2 This brought the total number of municipalities in our dataset to 
27.
The party manifestos of the eight largest national parties and their local branches 
in the selected municipalities were used to determine Participation Act positions. 
Considering that not all parties participated in local elections in each selected 
municipality and that some manifestos were unavailable, in total, 8 national and 
168 local party manifestos were collected and analysed.3 Online Appendix 1 shows 
which party manifestos are included in our analyses.
The inductively developed coding scheme can be found in Table  1. Only after 
intensively reading position statements of national political parties on the Participa-
tion Act, and multiple discussions in face-to-face meetings between the authors of 
this article, the coding scheme became a predefined format for analysing the local 
branches.
We first found seven regularly occurring main topics and identified whether 
these were mentioned in a particular manifesto or not: (1) Decentralisation of the 
2 Size: 9 small-sized municipalities = 25.000–50.000 inhabitants; 9 medium-sized municipali-
ties = 50.000–100.000 inhabitants; 9 large-sized municipalities =  > 150.000 inhabitants (the smallest 
municipalities are consequently not included in our dataset (100–25,000 inhabitants)). Social benefit 
dependency: 9 low social benefit dependency municipalities =  < 4.8%; 9 medium social benefit depend-
ency municipalities = 4.8–5.5%; 9 high social benefit dependency municipalities =  > 5.5%. Political con-
stellation is determined by the relative relevance of the following three party families in the municipali-
ties: 9 economically leftist municipalities (i.e. with high vote shares for the Socialist Party (SP), Labour 
Party (PvdA), and GreenLeft (GL)); 9 Christian municipalities ( i.e. with high vote shares for Christian-
Democratic Appeal (CDA), Christen Union (CU), and Reformed Political Party (SGP)); 9 economically 
conservative municipalities ( i.e. with high vote shares for People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy 
(VVD) and Democrats’66 (D66)).
3 As depicted in online appendix 1, 168 local branches participated in the local elections. Initially, 156 
manifestos could be retrieved from the internet. To collect the twelve missing manifestos, we contacted 
the local branches. In total, five missing manifestos were collected via e-mail communication. Seven 
local branches (D66 Nunspeet, D66-GL-PvdA Boxmeer, PvdA Rijssen-Holten, SP Kampen, VVD 
Deventer, SP Alphen aan den Rijn, and SP Venlo) did not respond to the e-mail and are, as a result, miss-
ing from the dataset.
1 The selected municipalities are as follows: Aalsmeer, Achtkarspelen, Almere, Alphen, Amers-
foort, Barneveld, Boxmeer, Deventer, Ede, Haarlem, Heerenveen, Kampen, Kerkrade, Lansingerland, 
Nijmegen, Nissewaard, Nunspeet, Rijssen-Holten, Roosendaal, Veenendaal, Velsen, Venlo, Vught, Wage-
ningen, Wassenaar, Westland, and Zwolle.
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Participation Act, (2) Welfare fraud, (3) Participation jobs,4 (4) Conditionality, (5) 
Reintegration trajectories, (6) Compulsory job applications, and (7) Welfare experi-
ments. We then discerned 30 subtopics within the seven main topics that covered a 
range of relevant issues concerning the Participation Act. For example: do parties 
address decentralisation in their manifesto? To whom do they assign responsibility 
for the implementation? Is some performance required in return for receiving ben-
efits? And what should be done about welfare fraud? With this codebook, we deter-
mined the ‘social policy positions’ of local political party branches.
Operationalisation
The ‘social policy positions’ of local political party branches consist of two ele-
ments: ‘topic presence’ and ‘position-taking’ on the Participation Act. Following 
Breeman et  al. (2015), topic presence measures the share of manifestos that pay 
attention to a main topic or subtopic for each of the eight political parties included. 
As such, topic presence was used to measure whether political parties deviate in 
topic presence per subtopic from: (1) their national mother party, or (2) their peer 
local branches from the same national mother party in other municipalities. It is thus 
based on discerning manifestos with code ‘no’ on a given subtopic from manifestos 
with code ‘yes’ (see Table 1). Code ‘no’ represents party manifestos that did not pre-
sent a position on a given subtopic, whereas code ‘yes’ represents party manifestos 
that did present a position. Two types of deviation in topic presence were discerned: 
(1) local versus national deviation and (2) local versus local deviation.
Local versus national topic presence deviation measures the share of subtop-
ics local branches (i.e. local manifestos) deviate on from the mother party. Local 
party branches deviated from the national mother party if one emphasised a sub-
topic, while the other one did not. Local versus local topic presence deviation indi-
cates the share of subtopics local branches deviate on from what the majority of 
local branches of their own party reports (50% of the local branches plus 1).5 This 
means that the local majority’s topic presence is a dichotomy: the majority addresses 
a topic, or it does not. Local party branches deviated from the majority of local 
branches of their own party if the former emphasised a subtopic, while the latter did 
not, or vice versa.
The second element of social policy positions is position-taking. It measures 
whether local political parties have a different position on a subtopic than: (1) their 
national mother party, or (2) their local party peers (local branches of the same 
national mother party). As depicted in Table 1, 26 of the 30 subtopics have three 
code options: there is no position (code A), there is position B, or there is position 
C. The remaining four subtopics have four code options. A party deviates from its 
5 Central parties vary in the number of participating local branches (ranging van 9 to 27), resulting in 
varying majorities. For example, CU’s majority is 11 local branches, whereas CDA’s majority is 14 local 
branches.
4 Participation jobs are customised for those far removed from the labour market. They aim to increase 
work experience and the likelihood of finding non-subsidised employment (Participation Act, 2003, p. 
10a lid 5).
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mother party or local majority if its code deviates from the code of the mother party 
or local majority. For example, a local party claims to be in favour of basic income 
experiments (row 29: code B), whereas the national mother party or the majority of 
local branches of their own party claim(s) to be opposed to this idea (code C).
Local versus national position-taking deviation is measured in the exact same 
way as the measurement of local versus national topic presence outlined above. 
Local versus local position-taking deviation is measured as the share of subtopics 
local branches deviate on from the majority of local branches of their own party.
To scrutinise our expectations, we linked deviation in topic presence and posi-
tion-taking to three municipality characteristics: population size, social benefit 
dependency, and vote share for local independent parties. Population size ranged 
from 26,055 (Wassenaar) to 200,914 (Almere); this being the number of inhabitants 
in 2017 (Statistics Netherlands 2017a).
Social benefit dependency is measured by means of the score of a municipality on 
a composite indicator—ranging from 3.5% (Lansingerland) to 8.9% (Kerkrade)—
comprising three items. The first item measures the unemployment rate per munici-
pality and ranged from 4.2% (Barneveld) to 8.3% (Almere) in the labour force in 
2017 (Statistics Netherlands 2017b). The second item measures the share of inhab-
itants relying on welfare (bijstand) between 2016 and 2017 and ranged from 1.3% 
(Almere) to 6.7% (Nijmegen) (Association of Dutch Municipalities 2018). The third 
item measures the share of inhabitants relying on a disability pensions (arbeidson-
geschiktheiduitkering) and ranged from 3.8% (Lansingerland) to 13.8% (Kerkrade) 
in 2016 (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 2016). The three items form a reli-
able scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.781), with an explained variance of 74.4% and factor 
loadings ranging from 0.77 (reliance on disability pension) to 0.88 (unemployment 
rate) to 0.93 (reliance on welfare), respectively.
Vote share for local independent parties ranges from 11% (Kampen) to 52% 
(Westland) and is based on the average of the vote shares in the 2010 and 2014 local 
elections (Kiesraad 2009, 2010, 2013, 2014a, b).
Results
We present our findings on social policy positions in three steps. First, we discuss 
whether we observe similarity or deviation in topic presence. This is followed by 
exploring the associations between topic presence deviation on the one hand and the 
local conditions of population size, social benefit dependency, and share of votes for 
local independent parties, on the other. Finally, we explore the association between 
position-taking deviation and those local conditions.
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Topic presence
Figure 1 demonstrates topic presence for all parties on the main Participation Act 
topics (determined by addressing at least one of its subtopics). The order of the top-
ics is determined by the topic presence in national party manifestos.
Figure  1 signals two clear patterns. First, although almost all manifestos pay 
attention to some aspects of the Participation Act (88%), we see that, if the data 
is disaggregated into main topics, both at the national (black dots) and local (bars) 
level, the attention paid to any of the topics is rather low. Tellingly, on average, each 
main topic is emphasised by less than 50% of the national parties. This percentage is 
even lower for the local branches (43%).
Second, there seems to be an association between the presence of main Participa-
tion Act topics in national and local manifestos: topics that are addressed most at the 
national level, ‘Participation Jobs’ (100%) and ‘Reintegration Trajectories’ (63%), 
are also addressed most in local manifestos (respectively, 70% and 70%). Attention 
paid to the ‘Decentralisation of the Participation Act’ (national: 0%; local: 24%) 
and ‘Compulsory Job Applications’ (national: 38%; local: 23%) are relatively low 
at both levels. Finally, in sharp contrast to the national level (63%), local manifestos 
hardly stress ‘Welfare Fraud’ (23%).
Figure 2 shows the similarity in topic presence between national party manifes-
tos and local party manifestos per party. Of course, this means that, at the national 
level, topic presence is a dichotomy: a given party addresses a certain topic or does 
not. We ordered the topics on the horizontal axis as follows: the topics addressed 
in a national-level manifesto are depicted to the left, while those not addressed 
are depicted to the right. The bars, again, depict the share of local manifestos that 
addressed a certain topic. The order of the topics is determined by the topic presence 
in local party manifestos.
Three clear patterns arise from Fig.  2. The first two concern the local versus 
national topic presence, whereas the final pattern concerns the local versus local 
Fig. 1  General topic presence per main topic. Horizontal axis: Main topics DPA Decentralisation of the 
Participation Act, CO conditionality, RIT reintegration trajectories, CJA compulsory job applications, 
WF welfare fraud, PJ participation jobs, WE welfare experiments
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Fig. 2  Local versus national and local versus local topic presence per party. Horizontal axis: Main top-
ics DPA Decentralisation of the Participation Act, CO conditionality, RIT reintegration trajectories, CJA 
compulsory job applications, WF welfare fraud, PJ participation jobs, WE welfare experiments. Bars: 
Percentage of local party branches addressing the main topic in their manifesto. Dotted line: left from 
line are topics addressed by the mother party, right from the line are topics not addressed by the mother 
party
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topic presence. First, the association between national and local topic presence 
proves stronger when the data is analysed per party (Fig. 2) than in general (Fig. 1). 
For almost all parties considered, topics addressed in national party manifestos are 
more often also addressed in local manifestos than topics unaddressed in national 
party manifestos, and vice versa. However, the strength of this association between 
national and local topic presence seems to vary across parties. The strongest rela-
tionship can be found in the Reformed Political Party (SGP): topics (not) addressed 
in the national manifesto are (not) addressed by nearly all local SGP branches 
(Fig. 2c). The Christian-Democratic Appeal (CDA), on the other hand, shows the 
weakest relationship: its branches less often address topics addressed by the national 
party than topics unaddressed by the national party (Fig. 2e).
Second, notwithstanding these associations, a limited number of local branches 
also deviate from their national party manifestos in terms of topic presence. For 
example, ‘Compulsory Job Applications’ is a relevant topic for local People’s Party 
for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) branches, whereas the mother party does not 
mention it. The Labour Party (PvdA), on the other hand, shows the exact opposite 
situation: ‘Compulsory Job Applications’ is addressed by the national party, but is 
barely mentioned by her local branches.
Now we turn to the analysis of local versus local topic presence. By focusing 
solely on the bars, we observe that local branches not only show strong resemblance 
in topic presence to their national party, but also to their party peers. Local branches 
completely agree on topic presence if the share of local branches addressing a main 
topic is either 0% (no local branch addresses the topic) or 100% (all local branches 
address the topic). As an illustration, the local Socialist Party (SP) branches show 
strong similarities in topic presence. Topics are either addressed by more than 60% 
or less than 20% of the local branches. For example, ‘Participation Jobs’ is addressed 
by 85% of the local SP branches, whereas ‘Welfare Experiments’ only by one of the 
local SP branches (Fig. 2h).
Thus, the general patterns reveal strong resemblance in topic presence, both for 
local versus national topic presence and for local versus local topic presence within 
a party. Hence, institutional isomorphism seems to be in play in the formulation of 
social policy positions by local party branches. However, to some extent, we also 
observe deviation in topic presence. The next section explores whether this can be 
linked to local conditions.
Topic presence deviation by local conditions
The observation that there is some topic presence deviation leads to the follow-up 
question: under which circumstances do local party branches deviate? Here, we will 
scrutinise our central expectations that in smaller municipalities, in municipalities 
with higher levels of social benefit dependency, and in municipalities with higher 
shares of votes for local independent challenger parties, both local versus national 
topic presence deviation and local versus local topic presence deviation will be 
larger. The limited statistical power accompanying a dataset of 27 cases makes 
focussing on levels of significance not informative, and we will consequently merely 
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focus on the size and direction of the regression coefficient for the theoretical inter-
pretation of our findings.
Figure 3a demonstrates the relationship between population size and both types 
of topic presence deviation. Each dot depicts topic presence deviation per munici-
pality. The black dots represent the average share of subtopics local branches deviate 
on from their national party in terms of topic presence per municipality (e.g. a score 
of 30% means that in a municipality, local branches, on average, deviate on 9 out 
of the 30 subtopics from their mother party). The white dots represent the share of 
subtopics that local branches deviate on from the majority of their party peers per 
municipality (e.g. a score of 7% means that in this municipality, local branches on 
average deviate on 2 out of the 30 subtopics from the majority of their party peers).
Figure  3a suggests two things. First, there is a relationship between local ver-
sus national topic presence deviation and population size. This relationship is 
in the expected direction: local party branches in smaller municipalities are more 
likely to diverge in terms of topic presence from their mother party than local party 
Fig. 3  Topic presence deviation by population size (a), social benefit dependency (b), and votes for local 
independent challenger parties (c)
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branches in larger municipalities. This coincides with the contingency scenario. 
Second, the relationship between local versus local position-taking deviation is in 
the opposite direction than expected. In other words, party branches in municipali-
ties with a larger population size are more likely to diverge from their peer parties’ 
topic presence than party branches in municipalities with a smaller population size. 
Thus, the local versus local topic presence deviation findings are contrary to what 
was expected and, as such, are not in line with our interpretation of the contingency 
theory scenario.
Figure 3b portrays the results for social benefit dependency and shows that the 
relationship between this dependency and local versus national and local versus 
local topic presence deviation is not in the expected direction. Party branches in 
municipalities with higher social benefit dependency are less, instead of more, likely 
to diverge from their mother party and peer parties in terms of topic presence. In 
short, the relationship between social benefit dependency and local variation in topic 
presence deviation is contrary to the contingency scenario.
Finally, Fig. 3c depicts the relationship between the share of votes for local inde-
pendent challengers and both types of topic presence deviation. Although the rela-
tionship between local versus national topic presence deviation and that share is 
in the expected direction, we consider it too weak to convincingly corroborate the 
expectation that local party branches deviate more in municipalities with a larger 
share votes for local independent challengers. Similarly, the relationship between 
local versus local topic presence deviation and the share of votes for local independ-
ent challengers is far too weak to be interpreted in accordance with the contingency 
scenario.
All in all, most findings clearly demonstrate that deviation in topic presence does 
not vary across municipalities in the way that contingency theory predicts. At least, 
not in the case of the contingencies of social benefit dependency and the salience 
of local party challengers. Only the population size associates with topic presence 
deviation according to the contingency theory scenario. And even then, this is only 
in the case of local versus national topic presence deviation, and marginally so at 
that.
Position‑taking deviation by local conditions
In addition to choosing whether to focus on a specific topic, local political par-
ties can also differ from their mother party, as well as from the majority of local 
branches of their own party, in the position they take on a specific topic. This is 
measured by means of position-taking. As outlined in the operationalisation section 
above, we apply the same analyses on local versus national position-taking devia-
tion and local versus local position-taking deviation as we did for topic presence 
deviation. Consequently, first we analyse whether we observe deviation in position-
taking and, subsequently, explore if the observed deviation is related to municipal 
conditions. We merely depict the relationships between the two types of deviation 
and the local conditions, as these provide all the necessary information (Fig. 4a–c).
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Position-taking deviation proves to be low: local versus national position-taking 
deviation ranges from 4% to 10%, and local versus local position-taking deviation 
ranges from 2% to 9% (Y-axes). This low level of deviation in position-taking should 
be considered when analysing its relationship with possible predictors.
Figure  4a shows the relationship between both types of social position-taking 
deviation and population size that are not in line with the contingency theory sce-
nario: i.e. we observe more deviation in municipalities with a larger population size. 
Figure 4b contrarily reports findings that are in line with that scenario. Especially 
local versus local position-taking deviation seems to be strongly related to social 
benefit dependency. Hence, local party branches are more likely to diverge from 
their mother or peer parties in municipalities in which this dependency is higher. 
The relationships reported in Fig. 4c are also in accordance with the contingency 
theory scenario: local party branches are more likely to diverge in position-taking 
from their mother party, and especially their local peer parties, in municipalities 
where the share of votes for local independent parties is higher.
Fig. 4  Position-taking deviation by population size (a), social benefit dependency (b), and votes for local 
independent challenger parties (c)
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Overall, three out of the six patterns depicted in Figs. 3 and four out of the six 
depicted in Fig. 4 can be interpreted according to the contingency theory scenario. 
Yet, only one of the seven relationships in accordance with that scenario is substan-
tial in strength: local to local position-taking deviation by social benefit dependency. 
In sum, there is very limited evidence that local parties, generally, aim to tailor their 
social policies to local conditions, at least not to the three municipal conditions that 
we focussed on.6
Conclusions and discussion
In this article, we addressed two questions. To what extent do Dutch local party 
branches’ social policy positions deviate from their national mother party and local 
peer parties? And do local conditions explain this deviation? To answer those ques-
tions, we strategically selected 27 Dutch municipalities, and subsequently created 
a dataset of 168 local party manifestos and 8 national party manifestos, all from 
2018. Even though we searched for maximum variation in relevant municipal condi-
tions, we observed that topic presence and, especially, position-taking in local party 
branches manifestos are (still) strongly associated with the topic presence and posi-
tion-taking of the national mother party and peer local branches.
As far as local party branches do deviate, it can hardly be interpreted according 
to the contingency theory scenario. We do not see that, generally, deviation is larger 
in municipalities that are smaller, that have higher levels of dependency on social 
benefits, or that have higher vote shares for independent local challengers. The only 
relationship convincingly in line with that scenario is that, in the limited cases in 
which local party branches do deviate from the local party branches’ majority, it 
occurs in municipalities with higher dependency on social benefits. Additionally, in 
the case of the relationship between population size and deviation, it might be that 
the findings are suppressed by the mechanism that allows local party branches in 
larger municipalities to have the power and the resources to act more independently 
from their mother parties than in smaller municipalities. But overall, the social poli-
cies addressed in the party manifestos of local party branches seem to reflect institu-
tional isomorphism more than adaptation to local contingencies.
There are at least two ways in which institutional isomorphism could have played 
a role in this: (1) normative isomorphism, i.e. the similarities reflect correspondence 
in normative viewpoints and party ideology, and (2) coercive isomorphism, i.e. they 
reflect imposition by the mother party. The first way is more in line with previous 
findings that the ideological bases of parties are good predictors for local party posi-
tions, even in times of decentralisation (Pogorelis et al. 2005). The second way may 
be informed by the existence of the so-called ‘basic party programs’ (basis verk-
iesprogramma’s). These are drawn up by the national mother party as an example 
for local party branches to use in drafting their manifestos. This support might, how-
ever, result in copying and pasting this basic programme and only adjusting the bare 
6 Multivariate regressions including all three municipality characteristics did not produce substantially 
different results. Analyses are available upon request.
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minimum to make it fit the local circumstances. However, it is beyond the scope of 
this research to determine how institutional isomorphism could have played a role in 
drafting party manifestos of local party branches.
Besides the role of institutional isomorphism, it might be that local conditions 
are hardly related to local party positions on social policies in accordance with the 
contingency theory scenario because local elections are determined by national as 
opposed to local issues. “Local election results overwhelmingly reflect national 
swings of opinion for or against the incumbent government” (Stoker 1991, p. 52). 
Institutional differences could also play a role. These might, for instance, account 
for why Pogorelis et  al. (2005) found that poor economic conditions prompted 
position deviation in Scotland and Wales, while higher levels of dependency on 
social benefits did not in our study. Future research focussing on similar questions 
but other institutional settings than the Netherlands could shed more light on this. 
Moreover, party characteristics could be more relevant than municipal character-
istics for local party positions on social policies; for instance, whether there is 
inclusive or exclusive internal party democracy as described by Lehrer (2012).
Two other reasons could also account for our finding that deviation in topic 
presence and position-taking on social policies by local party branches is mini-
mal. First, despite our focus on the first stage in local policy development fol-
lowing the decentralisation (party manifestos, instead of coalition agreements or 
policy making), it could be that our analyses came too soon to detect contingency 
pressures. This would imply that local variation in social policy positions has yet 
to materialise. Second, it might be that it already materialised, but remained hid-
den from view because of our focus on manifestos. On the one hand, the party 
manifesto “should be the first source of policies for a newly elected government” 
(Ashworth 2000, p. 13, cf. Hofferbert and Budge 1992). On the other hand, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that our central finding reflects discrepancy with 
actual positions pursued during policy discussions in local government. Future 
research could shed light on the empirical merits of these two interpretations of 
our unexpected results.
Furthermore, some limitations of this study need to be considered. First, we 
solely focused on the Netherlands. Consequently, our conclusions might be idi-
osyncratic. We do not know how far our findings travel beyond the Dutch case; 
perhaps policy decentralisation in other countries actually have led to substan-
tial policy position variation across municipalities, as contingency theory pre-
dicts. Second, the smallest type of municipalities is not included in our dataset, 
while including these municipalities might alter the results. Also, we recognise 
that local circumstances other than population size, social benefit dependency, 
and the salience of local independent challengers might be relevant for determin-
ing policy position variation across municipalities. Moreover, because a relevant 
dataset does not exist, we had to compose one ourselves by strategically selecting 
a sub-set of Dutch municipalities. It is, of course, possible that another sub-set 
would lead to different results. Finally, future research may complement the study 
of manifestos with in-depth interviews with local politicians in order to research 
how local manifestos are drawn up. This could reveal whether, and how, institu-
tional isomorphism plays a role.
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Finally, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first researchers to provide 
an extensive empirical analysis on the relationship between national mother par-
ties and local party branches in the process of social policy decentralisation. Our 
analysis of the Dutch case indicates that, four years after decentralisation, local 
party branches still largely operate as puppets instead of principals in formulating 
social policies. We caveat this with an important footnote that inevitable limita-
tions of data and time warrant care in drawing conclusions that are too far-reach-
ing in this matter.
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